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 Abstract 
During the summer of 2015, three Cessna 172 aircraft were crash tested at the Landing and Impact Research 
Facility (LandIR) at NASA Langley Research Center (LaRC).  The three tests simulated three different 
crash scenarios.  The first simulated a flare-to-stall emergency or hard landing onto a rigid surface such as 
a highway, the second simulated a controlled flight into terrain with a nose down pitch on the aircraft, and 
the third simulated a controlled flight into terrain with an attempt to unsuccessfully recover the aircraft 
immediately prior to impact, resulting in a tail strike condition.  An on-board data acquisition system 
captured 64 channels of airframe acceleration, along with acceleration and load in two onboard Hybrid II 
50th percentile Anthropomorphic Test Devices, representing the pilot and co-pilot.  Each test contained 
different airframe loading conditions and results show large differences in airframe performance.  This 
paper presents test methods used to conduct the crash tests and will summarize the airframe results from 
the test series. 
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Introduction 
 
NASA Langley Research Center’s (LaRC) Landing and Impact Research Facility (LandIR), shown in 
Figure 1, is 240-ft high, 400-ft long steel A-frame gantry structure built in 1965, and originally used to 
train the Apollo astronauts to land on the moon.   
 
 
Figure 1 - Landing and Impact Research Facility (LandIR) 
 
After the Apollo program ended in the early 1970s, the LandIR facility was converted into a full-scale 
aircraft crash facility, and, since the mid-1970s, has been used to test all types of aircraft for the 
improvement of safety features [1].  General Aviation (GA) airplane testing at LandIR has played a major 
role in the advancement of safety features amongst GA aircraft including improved aircraft seat test 
methods and design [2], energy absorbing subfloor concepts for attenuating loading into onboard occupants 
[3], and Emergency Locator Transmitter (ELT) performance improvements [4].    In addition, a large 
amount of crash test data was generated originating from a test program initiated in 1972 between NASA 
and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).  This test program investigated ways to develop 
technology for improved crashworthiness in GA airplanes [5].  Multiple series of crash tests were conducted 
both on low wing [6-9] and high wing [10] aircraft for the investigation of both aircraft performance and 
occupant survivability.  Since the mid-2000s, the LandIR facility has also been used to characterize NASA 
Orion spacecraft under various land and water landing conditions [11], and, in 2011, the Hydro Impact 
Basin [12] was built at the west end of the LandIR facility for use in full scale crash and impact testing into 
water. 
 
The LandIR facility is able to lift and swing various aircraft using a single (which introduces a pitch rate) 
or parallel (which removes the pitch rate) swing cabling system.  Either a single set or a parallel set of swing 
cables connected to the west end of the LandIR facility attach at hard-points into the aircraft.  Pull-back 
cabling connected to a movable overhead bridge located on the eastern side of the LandIR facility attach to 
the pullback points of the test article.  As the pullback cabling is retracted into the bridge winch system, the 
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aircraft is lifted into the air to a pre-determined drop height.  At the pre-determined height, a pyrotechnic 
system severs the pullback cabling, causing the test article to swing along a pendulum-like flight path from 
east to west into a pre-determined impact location on the ground.   Immediately before ground contact, an 
onboard pyrotechnic system severs the single or parallel swing cabling, allowing the aircraft to achieve a 
pure free fall flight condition during the last few milliseconds of the swing.  Various combinations of swing 
cable length, impact location, drop height, impact surface conditions (rigid, soil or water) along with a test 
article’s angle of attack can be prescribed, creating a large variety of impact conditions.   
 
The test series conducted in the summer of 2015 served to generate data for use in updating the performance 
specifications for the next generation of ELT systems.  ELT systems are present on all GA aircraft and are 
intended for use in a distress situation, such as an emergency or crash landing of an aircraft.  The ELT 
system is designed to automatically sense a crash event and transmit a distress signal to the Cosmicheskaya 
Sistyema Poiska Avariynich Sudov – Search and Rescue Satellite Aided Tracking (COSPAS-SARSAT) 
system.  The signal is then relayed down to a ground Local User Terminal (LUT), and ultimately Search 
and Rescue operatives are dispatched to the aircraft in distress.   
 
Since ELT systems must be designed to work in a potentially infinite number of different scenarios, a 
sample of three differing impact conditions capable of being replicated at the LandIR facility were selected.   
It is from the evaluation of these three crash tests that a large range of crash test data were generated.  
 
Airplane Overview 
 
Three Cessna high wing, four seat, GA 172 airplanes were purchased specifically for the test series.  They 
are pictured in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 - Airplane test articles 
 
Test article one was a 1958 172 which was current on its annual inspection.  Test article two was a 1958 
175, which is the 172 airframe, but contains a different engine and gearbox.  The third test article was a 
1974 172M also current on its annual inspection.  Test articles 1 and 3 were flying as late as the winter of 
2014, before being transported to NASA LaRC. 
 
Airplane Preparations  
 
Guidance was obtained from previous high-wing aircraft tests conducted in the late-1970’s for rigging, 
lifting and swinging the airplanes [13] at the LandIR facility.  Hardware fabricated for this test series was 
ultimately based on these heritage designs, but included updates and additions due to upgrades in the 
LandIR facility and data collection systems added since the 1970s.  
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A single over-wing swing location was chosen as the main swing point to be used in the tests.  By selecting 
a single over wing swing point, a pitch rate is introduced into each airframe, which is a way to simulate a 
pilot attempting to flare or pull the nose up immediately before impact.    
 
The LandIR main swing cables were attached into each aircraft using hardware designed to interface with 
the main wing-fuselage attachment points for the main over-wing swing location.  For each airplane, the 
wings were removed and two steel posts were retrofit around the front and rear wing-fuselage attachment 
points.  Aluminum C-channel beams were fastened back-to-back on either side of the steel posts, with a 
large portion of the channels extending forward of the forward post position.  A steel block with swivel 
hoist ring used as the swing cable attachment point was eventually installed between the C-channel beams, 
positioned at a distance forward of the forward wing attachment.  Because the eventual location of the main 
swing cables depended on the final center of gravity (CG) location of the airplane, the impact station under 
the LandIR facility and the pitch angle, this attachment was not installed until after each aircraft was fully 
ballasted and precise impact conditions were known.  Figure 3 shows the over wing attachment hardware, 
with main swing cable attachment location identified. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Main over-wing swing attachment hardware 
 
The main over-wing swing cables attached to the swivel hoist ring on the C-channel and terminated at a 
pear ring.  From the opposite end of the pear ring the main LandIR swing cables were attached.  Additional 
cabling was also attached to the pear ring, which was designed to keep the airplane from losing orientation 
during the swing.  This hardware and cabling was known as the pitch restraint hardware.   
 
The airplane was restricted to its desired impact orientation due to cabling extending from the pear rings to 
locations forward and aft of the main swing cables.  The forward restraint cables attached to hardware 
retrofit onto the engine, while the rear restraint cables attached to hardware retrofit onto a location near 
station 108, which is the aft cabin/forward tail junction on the airplane.  For each test, once the main swing 
cables were attached to the airplane, the correct pitch orientation was achieved by adjusting the restraint 
cable lengths.  Figure 4 shows the front pitch restraint hardware. 
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Figure 4 - Front pitch restraint hardware detail 
 
The year and model differences of the airplanes did not adversely affect the design of the front pitch restraint 
hardware, which was a simple bracket machined from stock material. Since each piece was custom made 
for each airplane, each engine hole-pattern and the height were pre-programmed into the cutting machine 
and the stock material was cut to size.  The year and model differences did, however, affect the rear pitch 
restraint hardware design.  Airplanes 1 and 2 were an earlier “straight tail” variant of the 172 design.  The 
straight tail design contained a continuous sloping geometry starting at the aft fuselage and terminating at 
the vertical stabilizer in the rear tail.  The straight tail design also included an internal frame stiffener at 
aircraft station 108.  Airplane 3 featured a newer “swept tail” variant of the 172 design.  The swept tail 
included improvements to pilot visibility by adding a rear split window, but removed the frame section at 
station 108.   
 
In order to facilitate the rear restraint lines on the different designs, two versions of the rear pitch restraint 
hardware were fabricated. In the straight tail design, the rear pitch restraint hardware was retrofit to the 
station 108 stiffener, with only an open hole protruding through the exterior of the aircraft skin in which to 
loop the restraint lines.   
 
In the swept tail design, a doubler-plate was added to the outer skin of the aircraft and attached to stiffening 
hardware on the interior of the tail.  Figure 5 shows both variants of the rear pitch restraint hardware. 
 
 
Figure 5 - Rear pitch restraint hardware detail 
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To facilitate the pullback for each test, each airplane was also outfitted with pullback hardware.  The 
airplane interfaced with the LandIR main pullback cable and spreader bar (used to divide the pullback load 
evenly to both the north and south sides of the test article) via the pullback hardware.  The pullback 
hardware consisted of two green polyester 1-in. wide straps attached to each side of the airplane.  The aft 
end of the over-wing C-channel swing hardware was also used for the upper pullback strap attachment 
point, and the lower pullback strap was attached to hardware retrofit onto the landing gear.  The straps were 
fabricated to custom lengths for each aircraft such that the angle created by the projection of the pullback 
cabling created a right angle with the projected location from the main over-wing swing cables when the 
airplane was at the correct drop height and orientation.  The cable lengths were also designed such that the 
point of intersection of these two projections was the location of the airplane CG.  Figure 6 shows the final 
test configuration of the airplane/LandIR facility rigging, with the projections of the cabling highlighted. 
 
 
Figure 6 - Airplane rigging in test configuration (Test 2 shown) 
 
Airplane Instrumentation 
 
Each aircraft was prepped with similar instrumentation, cameras and onboard experiments.  The rear seats 
and luggage area equipment were removed from each airplane, and an onboard ruggedized Data Acquisition 
System (DAS) was installed in its place.  This DAS, along with a time-code generator used in data 
synchronization, and the pyrotechnic cutter firing system were all enclosed in a protective cage, as to keep 
the systems intact in the event of a large amount of aircraft deformation and/or crushing.  The DAS 
equipment with cage also acted as rear seat/luggage area ballast.  Acceleration data were collected from 
accelerometers located throughout the fuselage along with accelerations and loads from two onboard 
Anthropomorphic Test Devices (ATDs, a.k.a. crash test dummies).   Three ruggedized onboard high speed 
cameras were also utilized during each test.  Additional high-definition cameras filming at either 30 or 60 
frames per second were utilized on certain exterior parts of each airplane. 
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Table 1 shows the channels of airframe acceleration instrumentation, and Table 2 shows ATD 
instrumentation.  All channels were sampled at 10 kHz.  The DAS and onboard high speed cameras were 
connected to computers in the LandIR control room via CAT 5e umbilical cables, and triggered using either 
a command from the control room computers or a switch button. 
 
Table 1- Airframe instrumentation 
Location Direction 
Engine Horizontal, Vertical, Lateral 
Firewall Horizontal, Vertical 
Floor under pilot seat (Pilot Floor) Horizontal, Vertical 
Floor under co-pilot seat (Co-Pilot Floor) Horizontal, Vertical 
Cabin ceiling at aft wing stiffener Horizontal, Vertical 
Left door frame Horizontal, Vertical 
Right door frame Horizontal, Vertical, Lateral 
DAS Rack (Rear Cabin/Luggage area) Horizontal, Vertical 
Tail Horizontal, Vertical, Lateral 
 
Table 2 - ATD instrumentation 
ATD Location Measurement Direction 
Head Acceleration Horizontal, Vertical 
Chest Acceleration Horizontal 
Pelvis Acceleration Horizontal, Vertical 
Lumbar Force Vertical 
Seatbelt Force Strap tension 
 
Instrumentation installed in the airframe presented in this report is oriented in the local airframe coordinate 
system, with vertical accelerations being in the Lift/Weight direction, with positive being upward, and 
horizontal accelerations being in the Thrust/Drag direction, with positive being forward.  All accelerations 
are filtered in accordance to SAE-J211 standards [14]. 
 
Other preparations included painting the pilot side of each airplane with a stochastic black and white speckle 
pattern. This pattern aided with the collection of airframe deformation data from a technique called full 
field photogrammetry [15].  Solid black lines were painted over the main rivet lines on the skin to aid in 
tracking of main frame and stiffener locations from the external cameras.  Additional lead weight was added 
over the wing to simulate fuel weight.  The lead, along with the main swing hardware, accounted for 
approximately 100 lb of weight over each wing, which simulated fuel tanks above 75% full.  Spoilers were 
attached to each wing to minimize lift generated due to the swinging of the aircraft during the test.  All 
control surfaces were locked in the VS1 (minimum steady flight speed) configuration, and the yokes were 
locked in their forward-most position.  Finally, multiple ELTs were mounted into the cabin or tail section 
of each aircraft for the evaluation of their performance.  
 
After all preparations were completed, a weight and balance test was performed on each test article, and is 
summarized in Table 3.  The horizontal CG is measured from the firewall, the lateral CG is measured from 
the aircraft centerline, and the vertical CG is measured from the ground.  The column labeled “Moment / 
1000” is calculated by multiplying the weight and horizontal CG.  It is this number that is typically found 
in a Pilot Operating Handbook to determine the aircraft category.  
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Table 3 - Aircraft test article weight and CG properties 
 
Test Weight (lb) Horizontal 
CG (in.) 
Lateral CG (in.) Vertical CG (in.) Moment / 
1000 (in.-lb) 
Category 
1 2000 44.5  0.0 46.25 89 Normal 
2 2114  39.5 0.0 48.1 101 Normal 
3 2072 42.5 0.0 50.8 89 Normal 
 
Crash Test 1 was designed to simulate a flare-to-stall onto a rigid surface such as concrete or road, whereas 
Tests 2 and 3 were designed to simulate a controlled flight into terrain condition.  In Test 2, the airplane 
impacted soil in a nose down configuration, in contrast to Test 3, where the airplane impacted soil in a nose 
up, tail strike condition.  All tests were conducted in the approximate range of the stall speed of each aircraft.   
 
Table 4 summarizes the as-measured impact conditions for each of the full-scale crash tests. 
 
Table 4 – Measured CG impact conditions 
Test Surface Horizontal 
Velocity – ft/sec 
– fps (kts) 
Vertical 
Velocity – 
fps (kts) 
Flight path 
velocity – fps 
(kts) 
Angle of 
Attack 
(deg) 
Pitch Rate 
(deg/sec) 
1 Concrete/Rigid 60.2 (35.7) 23 (13.6) 64.4 (38.2) +1.5 +16.5 
2 GUS 68.6 (40.6) 28.7 (17.0) 74.4 (44.0) -12.2 +16.1 
3 GUS 56.9 (33.7) 23.6 (14.0) 61.6 (36.5) +8.0 +13.3 
 
The soil surface used in Tests 2 and 3 consisted of a two foot thick bed of a clay-sand mixture, and was 
known as Gantry Unwashed Sand (GUS) [16].  Soil was characterized for Tests 2 and 3 using three major 
methods - calculating density, measuring moisture content, and measuring the bearing ratio as a function 
of depth.  These three parameters are likely to determine whether the soil is “hard” or “soft” and whether it 
is compact (like clay) or silty (like sand).  The parameters were measured immediately post-test at a variety 
of locations around the impact spot.  Ranges from the sets of measured parameters are reported, and a graph 
of the bearing ratio vs. depth is provided in the Test 2 and Test 3 sections.   
 
For all tests, a large yellow catch net was installed on the western side of the impact location to catch and 
stop the airplane in the event of a large amount of residual horizontal velocity after the impact.  The net 
was intended to restrict the airplane from rolling and plunging into the Hydro Impact Basin approximately 
100 feet away from the impact site.   The net was designed to break away from its supporting posts upon 
airplane contact, wrap around and dissipate the airplane motion through the pulling of two large drag 
weights. 
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Test 1  
 
Test 1 was conducted on July 1, 2015.  Figure 7, left, shows the airplane on the ground prior to the start of 
pullback, and, right, at the drop height. 
 
 
Figure 7 - Airplane configuration prior to Test 1.  Airplane on ground (left) and at drop height (right) 
 
In Test 1, the airplane impacted the concrete at a flight path velocity 64.4 ft/sec at an Angle of Attack (AoA) 
of approximately 1.5° nose high.  There was approximately 0.475 sec of time between the initial impact 
with the ground and the first contact of the catch net.  The pitch rotation and large mian gear flexing caused 
the rear portion of the tail to strike the ground approximately 0.125 sec after impact.  The primary vertical 
ground loading was complete at 0.200 sec, after which the aircraft rebounded with residual horizontal 
velocity and proceeded to impact the catch net.  The propeller first contacted the net approximately 0.475 
sec after initial impact.  The contact continued stretching the net, until it unlatched from the uprights starting 
approximately 0.500 sec after initial ground impact.  The net continued to wrap around the airplane until it 
started to move the drag weights approximately 1.120 sec after impact.  All motion stopped approximately 
5.85 sec after impact.  Figure 8 shows the sequence of the ground contact, while Figure 9 shows the 
sequence of events for the net contact. Table 5 summarizes these events in tabular form.   
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Figure 8 - Test 1 impact sequence – ground contact 
 
 
Figure 9 - Test 1 impact sequence - net contact 
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Table 5 - Event timing for Test 1 
 
Event Time after impact (sec) 
Nose gear impact 0.000 
Main gear impact 0.006 
Tail strike  0.125 
Catch net contact 0.475 
Second nose gear impact 0.814 
Second main gear impact 0.939 
Pilot door open 2.003 
Motion Stop 5.835 
 
 At a high level, the test can be discussed in terms of two distinct impact events.  The first event is the 
airplane impacting the concrete surface simulating a crash or emergency landing.  In this event, which 
occurs for the first 0.300 sec, the landing gear deforms and the plane rebounds with minimal loss in its 
original horizontal velocity.  As shown in Figure 10, the vertical acceleration shows a roughly trapezoidal 
shaped pulse resulting from the landing gear deflecting.  Examining the plateau in acceleration occurring 
between 0.015 sec (start of plateau) and 0.200 sec (start of airplane rebound) after impact, the average 
sustained acceleration varies between 4.1 g in the engine to 5.9 g in the tail.  The large 54.7 g peak in the 
tail is due to the tail strike, which occurred at 0.125 sec after the impact.  The horizontal acceleration is 
minimal with the exception of the noise seen in the tail accelerometer, which is due to the tail strike.   
 
 
Figure 10 – Test 1 airframe accelerations during ground impact 
 
The second event is the airplane interacting with the catch net.  The net was necessary to the test due to the 
constraints of the LandIR facility and not originally thought to be a part of the test.  However, when 
investigating the results, the net can simulate a real scenario such as an airplane impacting brush, berm or 
other obstruction after the initial emergency/crash landing.  Thus, it should be included in the data analysis 
in terms of its effect on the loading on the airframe and occupants. As shown in Figure 11, the horizontal 
acceleration in the airplane resulting from the catch net was a triangular pulse shape, lasting 0.5-sec and 
reaching average peak accelerations ranging between 4.0 g in the tail to 5.3 g on the engine.  The large 
spike at the end of the net contact in the tail data is a second tail strike onto the concrete. 
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Figure 11 – Test 1 airframe accelerations during net contact 
 
A complete summary of accelerations from Test 1 is presented in Appendix A. 
 
The airplane, stopped by the catch net, came to rest approximately 50 feet away from the initial impact 
location.  The net was wrapped around the nose and wings of the airplane, stopping it within 20 feet of first 
contact.  A photograph showing the post-test airplane and net is shown in Figure 12. 
 
 
Figure 12 - Airplane configuration post-test 
 
One of the first things that was noticed during post-test inspection was the unusual orientation of the nose 
gear.  The gear, while still intact, exhibited an unusual forward lean angle, pointing much further forward 
than before the test.  Inspection of the high speed videos suggests that the firewall attachment location of 
the gear buckled under the loads seen from the initial ground contact and the compression of the nose gear 
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during the time in which the main gear was deforming.  This finding was confirmed when conducting post-
test inspections of the firewall with the nose cover skin removed.   The buckling of the firewall also caused 
dents to appear in the nose cover skin, as seen in Figure 13. 
 
 
Figure 13 - Test 1 – Post-test nose buckling and landing gear orientation 
 
Damage also occurred on the wings near the wing strut attachment locations.  It was also at this approximate 
location where a vertical strap from the catch net was located.  The tension in the net occurring from the 
forward airplane velocity caused the net to start to compress the wing leading edge at the vertical strap 
location.   
 
It should also be noted that the main landing gear and wheel is visible in Figure 14.  All post-test inspections 
of the main landing gear springs showed no signs of damage, even after the landing gear exhibited large 
amounts of deformation during the initial ground contact.  One major finding was the deformation from the 
ground contact did not plastically deform the gear.  The wheels themselves still held air post-test, and the 
airplane was able to be rolled away back into the preparation hangar from the impact location for tear down. 
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Figure 14 - Test 1 – Post-test wing damage 
 
When examining the underside of the aircraft, the post-test inspections showed no damage on aircraft belly 
skin.  A small portion of the vertical stabilizer broke away from the airplane during the second tail contact, 
which occurred during the net catch, as shown in Figure 15.  Inspections of the internal structure of the tail 
showed small signs of buckling, mainly in the long unsupported spans where only the thin aircraft skin was 
present.    
 
 
Figure 15 - Test 1 – Post-test tail damage 
 
 15 
 
Test 2  
 
Test 2 was conducted on July 29, 2015.  Figure 16, left, shows the airplane on the ground prior to the start 
of pullback, and, right, at the drop height. 
 
 
Figure 16 - Airplane configuration prior to Test 2.  Airplane on ground (left) and at drop height (right) 
 
Test 2 was the first of 2 tests where the airplane impacted a soil surface.  The surface was to represent a dirt 
field or other type of unprepared surface not considered rigid.  The airplane CG impacted the soil at a 68.6-
ft/sec horizontal and 28.7-ft/sec vertical velocities.  The AoA was 12.2° nose down with a pitch rate of 
+16.1 deg/sec.   
 
The surface of the soil was wetted using a hose approximately one hour before the test.  The moisture 
content for Test 2 varied between 8.8% and 22.6% by weight.  Density of the soil varied between 108 lb/ft3 
and 127 lb/ft3.  The bearing capacity at one particular location is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
Figure 17 - Bearing capacity of the soil in Test 2 
 
The airplane nose gear impacted the soil first and began to plow into it.  The nose of the airplane impacted 
the soil approximately 0.070 sec after initial nose gear contact with the soil.  The nose and nose gear plowing 
into the soil continued to occur until the left wing broke away from the fuselage at 0.111 sec after impact.  
At 0.169 sec after impact, the plowing caused the tail to buckle, and at 0.240 sec after impact, the airplane 
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started to flip over.  The flipping occurred due to the penetration of the nose gear into the soil.  While the 
soil stopped the nose gear’s motion, it also created a pivot point for the rest of the airplane to rotate around.  
At some point during the rotation, the nose gear broke away from the rest of the airplane. This sequence is 
captured in Figure 18.   
  
 
Figure 18 - Test 2 impact sequence - side view 
 
The rest of the impact was captured from an end view camera.  The rotation of the airplane continued to 
occur until the airplane landed upside-down approximately 1.976 sec after impact.  It continued to rock 
back and forth until it came to final rest 6.790 sec after impact.  Figure 19 shows the continuation of the 
impact sequence. 
 17 
 
 
Figure 19 - Test 2 impact sequence - end view 
 
Table 6 summarizes these events in tabular form. 
 
Table 6 - Event timing for Test 2 
Event Time after impact (sec) 
Nose gear impact 0.000 
Main gear impact 0.026 
Nose impact  0.071 
Left Wing Break 0.111 
Airplane nearly vertical 1.035 
Tail net contact 1.896 
Motion Stop 6.790 
 
Vertical accelerations from the different portions of the airplane are different in magnitude, duration and 
shape, as shown in Figure 20.  The engine experiences a peak acceleration of less than 9 g, which occurred 
0.118 sec. after impact, after which, the engine experiences negative accelerations for the next 0.100 sec.  
The cabin of the airplane experiences maximum accelerations.  The pilot floor accelerometer, located in 
the forward cabin, and the DAS floor accelerometer, located in the rear cabin, show peaks of 23.2 and 24.7 
g, respectively.  The tail acceleration starts negative, but then resembles a 0.130-sec plateau shape at +8.1 
g mean acceleration.   
 
Horizontal accelerations, shown in Figure 20, exhibit similar responses for both shape, magnitude and 
duration for all locations, with the exception of a large spike in the DAS floor.  Engine acceleration is not 
plotted due to a severed cable which resulted in signal loss from that location, and the firewall location is 
also not plotted due to a small signal to noise ratio.   The horizontal acceleration resembles a 0.135-sec 
triangular pulse with negative peaks of 27.1 g, 39.5 g and 19.9 g for the pilot floor, DAS floor and tail, 
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respectively.  The average acceleration for the pulse shape is 18.7 g, 18.4 g and 13.5 g for the pilot floor, 
DAS floor and tail, respectively. 
 
 
Figure 20 - Test 2 airframe accelerations 
 
A complete summary of accelerations from Test 2 is presented in Appendix A.  
 
The airplane came to rest on the soil surface approximately 20 feet away from the impact point, upside-
down and skewed toward the co-pilot’s direction.  The short slide-out distance is due to the flipping of the 
airplane at impact. The aircraft and separated nose gear can be seen in Figure 21. 
 
 
Figure 21 - Airplane configuration post-test 
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Major nose damage was caused by the nose gear protruding into the dirt, causing a large bending moment 
about the firewall.   The firewall buckling caused skin damage seen in the nose of the airplane.  The nose 
gear also broke free from the firewall and ended up in the soil, approximately 10 feet away from the airplane.  
The damage in the underside of the nose is shown in Figure 22.  Some of this damage was caused by the 
firewall buckling and landing gear breaking away, while some was caused by the underside of the nose 
penetrating into the dirt, shearing portions of the skin near already failed regions near the firewall.  The 
propeller, however, appeared to be intact, with only a small amount of denting on the spinner.    
 
 
Figure 22 – Test 2 – Post-test nose damage 
 
Figure 23 shows the extent of the damage on the co-pilot side of the airframe.  A large gap, along with a 
large amount of skin buckling can be seen at the firewall location by the nose, and along the lower portion 
of the nose, near where the nose gear would normally be.  Cabin damage is most noticeable by noting the 
co-pilot door has broken free from the rest of the airframe.  The removed door, along with the creases in 
the skin behind the door, indicate large amounts of bending in the cabin area of the fuselage also.   
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Figure 23 – Test 2 – Post-test airframe damage - Nose and co-pilot side cabin 
 
Damage on the pilot side of the airframe is most notable by examining the wing attachment locations, as 
shown in Figure 24.  The attachment brackets on the wing connections fractured, causing the wing to come 
completely dislodged at the wing attachment locations on the fuselage and come to rest next to the body of 
the airplane.  Further inspections of the wing attachment locations post-test suggest that age and wear on 
the wing attachment brackets caused this failure.     
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Figure 24 – Airframe damage - Pilot's wing.  At impact location (top) and further inspections in the 
hangar (bottom) 
 
The tail also saw a large amount of deformation during the test, however it did not break free of the cabin.  
Instead, large amounts of buckling were examined in the area slightly aft of station 108, as shown in Figure 
25.  It is at this location where the floor of the cabin ends, and thus presents an area of differing overall 
airframe stiffness.  It is likely because of the difference in stiffness that the buckling occurred in this region. 
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Figure 25 – Test 2 – Post-test pilot side tail damage 
 
Test 3  
 
Test 3 was conducted on August 26, 2015. Figure 26 left, shows the airplane on the ground prior to the start 
of pullback supported in its impact condition by large blocks, and, right, at the drop height. 
 
 
Figure 26 - Airplane configuration prior to Test 3.  Airplane on ground (left) and at drop height (right) 
 
Test 3 also impacted a soil surface.  As with Test 2, the surface was to represent a dirt field or other type of 
unprepared surface not considered rigid.  As shown in Figure 27, the surface was tilled on the day of the 
test to remove any surface compaction that may have occurred due to personnel walking on it leading up to 
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the test day, since the soil was left in place for 4 weeks between Tests 2 and 3.   The soil was not wetted 
down immediately prior to the test. 
 
 
Figure 27 – Preparing the soil surface prior to Test 3 
 
The airplane CG impacted the soil at a 56.9-ft/sec horizontal and 23.6-ft/sec vertical velocities.  The AoA 
was 8° nose up with a pitch rate of +13.3 deg/sec.   There was a slight amount of roll (right side high) and 
yaw (nose left) to the test article for Test 3.   
 
Due to the slight amount of roll and yaw, the airplane left main gear impacted the soil first.  As the tire and 
the gear deformed, the tail contacted the surface at 0.030 sec after impact.  The nose gear, along with the 
nose of the airplane contacted the surface at 0.116 sec after impact.  As with Test 2, it was after the nose 
gear penetrated into the soil surface that the airplane started to exhibit a rotation around the nose.  Unlike 
Test 2, however, the tail developed a fracture aft of station 108 at 0.138 sec after impact.  This fracture 
caused the tail to peel away from the fuselage, acting much like a hinge.  A small portion of skin on the 
bottom of the aircraft retained the tail to the rest of the airplane during the rotation.  The rotation of the 
aircraft lasted until approximately 1.53 sec after impact, at which time the ceiling of the airplane contacted 
the soil.  The airplane rocked for a few seconds before finally coming to rest at almost 5 sec after initial 
impact.  A time sequence is depicted in Figure 28, as captured from one of the black and white side view 
cameras and Figure 29, as captured by the end view camera.  
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Figure 28 - Test 3 impact sequence - side view 
 
 
Figure 29 - Test 3 impact sequence - end view 
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Table 7 shows the timing sequence for Test 3.   
 
Table 7 - Event timing for Test 3 
Event Time after impact (sec) 
Left main gear contact 0.000 
Tail contact 0.030 
Nose contact 0.116 
Tail break begin 0.138 
Fuselage Vertical 0.660 
Ceiling contact (upside-down) 1.530 
Motion stop 4.920 
 
Figure 30 shows the airframe accelerations.  A slap down effect can be seen in the vertical acceleration 
plots.  The tail strike is first captured by the instrumentation approximately 0.080 sec after initial impact 
and reaches a peak of approximately 32 g.   The peak accelerations from locations going from aft to forward 
then occur in sequence.  These accelerations reach their peaks of 27.5 g, 26.0 g, and 15.5 g, at 0.165 sec, 
0.193 sec and 0.206 sec after first contact for the DAS floor, firewall and engine, respectively.  The vertical 
acceleration pulse duration for all locations is approximately 0.240 sec.   
 
The horizontal accelerations resemble either a triangular or trapezoidal pulse shape, depending on the 
location under investigation.  The engine acceleration peaks at -22.1 g at 0.210 sec after impact, shaped 
over a 0.180-sec triangular pulse.  The firewall, exhibited a peak acceleration of -38.9 g; however, this peak 
is likely due to the increased noise in the signal from the firewall location.  The peak occurs at 0.165 sec 
after impact and the shape also resembles a 0.180-sec triangular pulse.  The DAS floor and tail are more 
representative of a trapezoidal pulse, having a 0.050-sec sustained acceleration and a total pulse width of 
0.250 sec.   The DAS floor sustained peak acceleration is approximately -8.7 g, while the tail reaches a 
sustained peak acceleration of -8.1 g.  The accelerations are caused from the dragging of the airplane 
through the dirt before rotation around the nose gear tire begins, and they occur mainly in the rear portions 
of the airplane due to the tail strike condition. 
 
 
Figure 30 - Test 3 airframe accelerations 
 
A complete summary of accelerations from Test 3 is presented in Appendix A.  
 
The moisture content for Test 3 varied between 11% and 14% by weight.  Density of the soil varied between 
138 lb/ft3 and 152 lb/ft3.  The bearing strength of the soil at the surface was about 1300 lb/ft3, which dropped 
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to approximately 800 lb/ft3 at a depth of 1 foot, and sustained this strength to the bottom depth of 2 feet.   
The bearing capacity as a function of depth is shown in Figure 31. 
 
 
Figure 31 - Bearing capacity of the soil for Test 3 
 
The airplane came to rest on the soil surface approximately 20 feet away from the impact point, upside-
down and slightly skewed toward the co-pilot’s direction (right side).  The short slide-out distance is due 
to the flipping of the airplane at impact, as shown in Figure 32.    
 
 
Figure 32 - Airplane configuration post-test 
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The nose of the airplane was much more intact than on the Test 2 airplane.  Due to the slap down effect, 
the tail strike caused the airplane to lose much of its initial horizontal velocity, such that when the nose 
impacted, there was less of a shearing effect and more vertical crushing.   The nose gear remained attached 
to the firewall, however there was still firewall damage, causing nose skin wrinkling and buckling, as 
depicted in Figure 33.      
 
 
Figure 33 – Test 3 – Post-test nose damage 
 
Unlike Tests 1 and 2, the landing gear on Test 3 consisted of a hollow tube design. Normally covered by 
fairings (removed for the crash tests), the tubular landing gear exhibited large amounts of plastic 
deformation post-test; however, the tubes did not break.  The impact with the soil surface due to the slap-
down caused these permanent deformations to occur.   The wheels appeared to be intact post-test, as shown 
in Figure 34. 
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Figure 34 – Test 3 – Post-test landing gear deformation 
 
The tail fracture occurred just aft of the 108 station in the airplane, where the cabin transitioned into the 
tail.  This transition area offered an ideal place for failure due to the differences in stiffness.  A still image 
is captured during the test in Figure 35, left, showing the opening caused by the fracture in the tail during 
the test.  Figure 35, right, shows a close up of the fracture, which is located just aft of the rear window, at 
station 108. 
 
 
Figure 35 – Test 3 – Post-test tail failure 
 
Discussion 
 
The airplane used in Test 1 sustained minor damage from the test.  The major finding was the main gear 
springs absorbed the vertical impact velocity without showing signs of permanent damage.  The main gears 
were fabricated from single pieces of 0.7-in. thick spring steel and hinge attached to the airframe at locations 
under the cabin floor.  It is due to the bending of the main gear that the vertical acceleration was sustained 
for such a long time and at a relatively low (compared to the other two tests) level.  The addition of the 
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catch net proved to be beneficial in simulating an impact into a berm or brush, due to the onset rate, peak 
and duration of the horizontal acceleration.  It is from the catch net that the wings saw their damage.  The 
belly of the aircraft was undamaged during the test, with only the tail striking the rigid surface during both 
the initial ground contact, and also during the net catch. 
 
Tests 2 and 3, while different in their impact conditions, both resulted in the airplane flipping over and 
sustaining large amounts of damage.  These similar results are due to the nose gear contacting and 
penetrating the dirt surface, causing a large rotation around the front of the airplane.  Also, once the main 
gear penetrated the dirt, the horizontal velocity pushes the fuselage of the aircraft around the nose, resulting 
in large amounts of damage near the firewall area.  In the case of Test 2, the nose gear attachment sheared 
completely off during the crush of the nose from the dirt and the flipping of the aircraft. 
 
Test 3 was the only test that impacted in a tail strike configuration.  It is from this tail strike configuration 
that the airframe exhibited a slap down effect.  A slap down is where the tail strike caused a rotation in the 
cabin section about the tail resulting in higher vertical acceleration in the forward portions of the aircraft.  
However, the slap down effect only occurred until the nose gear penetrated the soil.  After the nose gear 
penetrated the soil, the aircraft from Test 3 mimicked the result from Test 2 by flipping over and landing 
upside-down.  
 
In both of the tests conducted onto soil, the tail buckled just aft of the cabin-tail junction.  Even with the 
differences in tail design (straight tail for Test 2 and swept tail for Test 3), the difference in global stiffness 
between the cabin and tail resulted in an ideal spot for the initiation and propagation of buckling.  The 
difference, however is the straight tail only showed signs of major buckling whereas the swept tail did 
exhibit fracture.  The addition of the rear window in the swept tail design likely weakened the tail structure 
enough to cause the fracture, along with the differences in impact conditions, made for a larger vertical 
acceleration in the tail for Test 3.   
 
Differences in the landing gear seemed to have little effect on the overall aircraft response for the tests 
conducted on soil.  Test 2 main gear was the same spring steel design as Test 1, while the Test 3 gear were 
fabricated from a hollow tube.   The difference in the performance, however, was negligible from the main 
gear, as the overall response was mainly dominated by the nose gear/soil interaction.  Test 3 landing gear, 
however, was the only gear that exhibited permanent deformation when examined post-test. 
 
In all three tests, the available volume in the cabin remained intact enough as to not infringe into the onboard 
occupants.   The restraints used on each test were different for both the pilot and co-pilot, and while 
different, all of the restraints used kept both occupants strapped into their seats post-test for all three tests, 
even while the airplanes were orientated upside-down.  Various criteria and metrics for the determination 
of occupant injury will be applied on the occupant and restraint data at a future time. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Three crash tests were successfully conducted on three Cessna 172 GA aircraft at NASA LaRC’s LandIR 
facility during the summer of 2015.  These tests served to generate data for three differing crash conditions 
in order to assess ELT performance.  Airframe, ATD and ELT acceleration data, as well as high speed video 
data showing airframe deformation and ELT survivability were all generated from the crash test series.  
Results from airframe acceleration and general deformation data are presented in this report.  Future reports 
will discuss ELT peroformance, occupant survivability, and photogrammetry results. 
 
These test data will be also used in computer modeling efforts to ensure that created computer models of 
the three tests are within calibration parameters.  Once calibration is complete, these computer models can 
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be used to simulate a potential infinite number of crash conditions not tested in this test series to further 
understand loading conditions which occur in a wide range of crash types. 
 
The data will also be used to guide the develepment for next generation ELT guidelines, by providing 
insight as to the response of ELTs under three realistic crash conditions.  The results can also be used as a 
basis for comparisons for certain types of real airplane crashes, and may help guide post-crash 
investigations.  Finally, due to the extensive video coverage used in each test, the precise sequence of events 
can be scrutinized, which can lead to increased understanding of what happens during real GA airplane 
crashes, which will ultimately be used to save lives in the aviation community. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
ACCELERATION DATA SUMMARY 
 
Acceleration data presented in the below tables represents a summary of the data collected from the tests.  
The columns presented are as follows: average acceleration, peak acceleration, event starting time, pulse 
duration, and delta velocity (delta-v).   
 
The average acceleration was determined from taking the mean value of the acceleration curves starting at 
the start of the acceleration event (event start) and lasting through the pulse duration.  This number differs 
from the average peak acceleration reported in the above sections.  An average peak acceration reported in 
the above sections represents a smoothed (typically a point averaged) peak acceleration value.   
 
The peak acceleration was extracted from the maximum value on the filtered acceleration curve between 
the event start and pulse duration.  Note that the post-test data filtering type and value greatly affects this 
number.  Caution must be used when only reporting this number, as it should be reported in conjunction 
with the average, or averaged peak, described above.   
 
Event start and event duration indicate the beginning of the decelerations due to the impact event.  The 
event starting point was the time in the data trace that showed a non-zero significant deceleration, and the 
event duration lasted through the impact event. The pulse duration for each test was identical for all sensors 
for each test, however the pulse durations between tests were different due to the differing impact 
conditions.   
 
Delta velocity values represent an integrated value arising from the integration between the start of the 
event and lasting through the pulse duration, and is reported in terms of feet per second.   
 
For cells labeled N/A, data are not available.  
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Table A.1 – Test 1 Acceleration Data Summary 
 
 Horizontal – Reported for Catch Net Capture Vertical – Reported for Ground Impact 
Average 
Acceleration 
(+g) 
Peak 
acceleration 
(+g) 
Event 
Start 
(sec) 
Event 
Duration  
(sec) 
Delta-v 
(fps) 
Average 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Peak 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Event 
Start 
(sec) 
Duration 
(sec) 
Delta-v 
(fps) 
Engine 3.3 11.5 0.8629 0.500 53.4 4.1 12.3 0.015 0.185 24.4 
Firewall 3.0 16.7 0.8629 0.500 48.5 4.3 11.4 0.015 0.185 25.7 
Forward 
cabin  
2.9 29.8 0.8629 0.500 46.9 4.8 10.4 0.015 0.185 28.4 
Left Door 
Frame 
3.1 27.8 0.8629 0.500 52.0 4.8 14.0 0.015 0.185 28.7 
Right Door 
Frame 
2.8 19.8 0.8629 0.500 45.7 4.8 13.3 0.015 0.185 28.2 
Rear Cabin 
(DAS) 
2.8 9.9 0.8629 0.500 44.9 4.6 15.3 0.015 0.185 30.0 
Tail 4.0 23.7 0.8629 0.500 48.9 5.9 54.7 0.015 0.185 35.0 
 
 
Table A.2 – Test 2 Acceleration Data Summary 
 
 Horizontal Vertical 
Average 
Acceleration 
(+g) 
Peak 
acceleration 
(+g) 
Event 
Start 
(sec) 
Duration  
(sec) 
Delta-v 
(fps) 
Average 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Peak 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Event 
Start 
(sec) 
Duration 
(sec) 
Delta-v 
(fps) 
Engine N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 2.3 8.7 0.036 0.164 7.8 
Firewall N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Forward 
cabin  
18.7 27.1 0.065 0.135 48.5 7.0 23.2 0.036 0.164 27.9 
Left Door 
Frame 
14.1 24.5 0.065 0.135 38.9 13.1 29.7 0.036 0.164 30.7 
Right Door 
Frame 
16.3 24.0 0.065 0.135 44.8 14..3 35.6 0.036 0.164 36.9 
Rear Cabin 
(DAS) 
18.4 39.5 0.065 0.135 42.9 17.4 24.7 0.036 0.164 46.3 
Tail 13.5 19.9 0.065 0.135 33.5 8.1 15.5 0.036 0.164 39.5 
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Table A.3 – Test 3 Acceleration Data Summary 
 
 Horizontal Vertical 
Average 
Acceleration 
(+g) 
Peak 
acceleration 
(+g) 
Event 
Start 
(sec) 
Duration  
(sec) 
Delta-v 
(fps) 
Average 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Peak 
Acceleration 
(g) 
Event 
Start 
(sec) 
Duration 
(sec) 
Delta-v 
(fps) 
Engine 5.9 22.1 0.0575 0.323 50.2 2.5 15.5 0.010 0.239 18.3 
Firewall 4.5 38.9 0.0575 0.323 38.6 3.7 26.0 0.010 0.239 27.1 
Forward 
cabin  
5.3 18.1 0.0575 0.323 45.7 5.0 18.0 0.010 0.239 38.5 
Left Door 
Frame 
4.3 16.1 0.0575 0.323 41.2 6.7 20.2 0.010 0.239 50.0 
Right Door 
Frame 
N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 6.9 18.8 0.010 0.239 50.7 
Rear Cabin 
(DAS) 
3.3 18.7 0.0575 0.323 30.5 7.9 27.5 0.010 0.239 58.2 
Tail 2.4 35.2 0.0575 0.323 22.7 9.6 32.2 0.010 0.239 71.1 
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